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Abstract. As in standard knowledge bases, hybrid knowledge bases (i.e., sets
of information specified by hybrid formulas) may contain inconsistencies aris-
ing from different sources, namely from the many mechanisms used to collect
relevant information. Being a fact, rather than a queer anomaly, inconsistency
also needs to be addressed in the context of hybrid logic applications. This
paper introduces a paraconsistent version of hybrid logic which is able to ac-
commodate inconsistencies at local points without implying global failure. A
main feature of the resulting logic, crucial to our approach, is the fact that
every hybrid formula has an equivalent formula in negation normal form.
The paper also provides a measure to quantify the inconsistency of a hybrid
knowledge base, useful as a possible basis for comparing knowledge bases.
Finally, the concepts of extrinsic and intrinsic inconsistency of a theory are
discussed.
1. Introduction
Management of knowledge and information is a key issue in all infra-structures
underlying modern information-centric societies. Therefore, the study and devel-
opment of flexible logical systems able to handle heterogeneous and complex data
has become more and more relevant in the last two decades, resorting to interdis-
ciplinary research in Linguistics, Computer Science, Mathematics and even Philos-
ophy.
A knowledge (management) base is a process which stores in digital form huge,
complex information, either structured or unstructured to be processed by several
sorts of software systems. A crucial ingredient in this process is the inference of new
data from old, which entails the need for its precise representation in an adequate
logical formalism.
Description logics are variants of first-order logic which count as one of the most
popular formalisms to deal with knowledge bases. In strict first-order logic, the
evaluation of a formula is unable to consider the context in which it takes place.
Since data is obtained from different sources, and often through an elementary
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2natural language interface, special care is required to distinguish and classify for-
mulas according to the different modes (or degrees, or stages) in which they can be
understood as true statements. Modal logic ([9]) provides a formalism for distin-
guishing between various modes of truth, or modalities, such as knowledge, necessity
or time. From a proof-theoretical point of view, such logics have interesting algo-
rithmic properties, and, moreover, can naturally be translated into first-order logic.
However, they lack the ability to explicitly refer to specific states, or stages of in-
terpretation, which, in a number of cases, is a desirable feature. Hybrid logic [8], on
the other hand, overcomes this limitation by introducing a new set of propositional
symbols, called nominals, each of them holding only at a specific state — the state
it names.
Often the act of collecting data for populating a knowledge base introduces con-
tradictions. Being a common fact rather than a queer anomaly, contradictions have
to be suitably addressed. In particular, one needs to handle data exhibiting, at the
same time, assertions of the form q and ¬q, configuring local contradictions, but
without producing global inconsistency. This is certainly a problem for database
operations with theorem-provers, and so has drawn much attention from computer
scientists. Techniques for removing contradictory information have been investi-
gated, for example, in [29]. Yet, all of them have limited applicability, and, in any
case, do not guarantee that consistency has been enforced.
An alternative approach offers a safe way to “live” with inconsistency. Such
is the domain of paraconsistent reasoning — a natural way to deal with inconsis-
tency allowing both a sentence and its negation to be true. Paraconsistent logic
is a mature and well established field of mathematical logic as the entry “03B53 -
Paraconsistent logics” in the 2010 Mathematics Subject Classification evidences.
A paraconsistent logic is a kind of non-classical logical system that does not
obey the Principle of Explosion which states that from contradictory premises any
formula can be derived. The Russian Vasil’e´v proposed, in 1910, a modified Aris-
totelian syllogistic including statements of the form: “S is both P and not P”, which
seems to be the earliest paraconsistent logic in the contemporary era. However the
proposal did not make any significant impact at the time. Later on, the Polish
logician Stanis law Jas´kowski, disciple of  Lukasiewicz, developed the first (formal)
system of propositional paraconsistent logic ([22]). Afterwards, for the last sixty
years, many philosophers, logicians and mathematicians have become involved in
the area. The Brazilian logic school (Newton da Costa, Walter Carnielli, Jean-Yves
Be´ziau, Joa˜o Marcos, etc.) is prominent among them. The theory of paraconsistent
logic has developed considerably as witnessed by both the increase in the number
of publications, the number of dedicated specialized journals, and that of interna-
tional conferences (e.g., 5th World Congress on Paraconsistency, in Kolkata, India,
2014; see [4, 12, 6, 26] for the proceedings of previous congresses).
Several variants of paraconsistent logic have been proposed, often to meet dif-
ferent aims or target specific applications [24]. Research has been driven not only
by theoretical interest, but also by genuine problems in different scientific domains,
namely Computer Science, Medicine and Robotics. In the medical practice, for
example, consulting two or more doctors may lead to (partially) contradictory
diagnoses, none of them to be dismissed. In Physics, paraconsistent logic was
used to deal with some aspects of quantum mechanics in [14]. In Computer Sci-
ence, subdomains like requirements engineering ([18]), artificial intelligence ([15])
3and automated reasoning within information processing knowledge bases ([16]) are
among the most relevant areas in which paraconsistent logic can address theoretical
difficulties raised by inconsistent data. Other applications are discussed in [28].
To the best of our knowledge, published work in this direction is only con-
cerned with inconsistencies in knowledge bases represented by first-order formulas.
The work of Grant and Hunter and their collaborators is the most representative
([19, 20, 21]). In particular, they propose Quasi-Classical (QC) logic, in [5, 19],
which provides a measure for the inconsistency of data represented as a set of first-
order formulas. Measuring inconsistency is crucial to an effective management of
information, namely for comparing between different knowledge w.r.t. contradic-
tions, allowing us to choose the ones with less conflicts. (The measure of inconsis-
tency has also been studied by other logicians, for example Arieli and Zamansky in
[3, 2].) The notion of Tarski’s satisfaction in [19] is decoupled into two interpreta-
tions for the predicate symbols: one for positive literals, and another for negative
ones. This semantics leads to weaker paraconsistent logics commonly known as
First-Degree Entailment. As in the standard case, models (which are bistructures)
can be represented by a set of ground literals. The definition of minimal QC models
is introduced and it is proved that no useful information is lost when resorting to
these models only. The inconsistency measure of a model is given by the quotient
between the number of contradictions actually present in the bistructure and the
total possible number of contradictions it may have.
This paper proposes a new mathematical procedure to reason about knowledge
bases formalised in hybrid logic that may contain inconsistencies arising from the
way data was obtained. A variant of paraconsistent hybrid logic, following the
work of Grant and Hunter ([19]), is presented. An important result that makes this
generalization possible is the existence of Robinson diagrams in (global) hybrid
logic. The method of diagrams, introduced by L. A. Henkin and A. Robinson, is a
useful tool in Model Theory; for instance the diagram of A, , the set of all atomic
sentences and negation of atomic sentences that are true in A, “characterizes” all
the models into which A can be embedded. This implies that hybrid models can be
represented by a set of hybrid formulas in an extended language with new nominals
such that all worlds are named.
In order to avoid double negation, we assume that all formulas are in negation
normal form. The generalization is not straightforward, as explained below, but
it allows for a reformulation of several notions (e.g. bistructure, minimal model,
conflict base, etc.) in a new context. It should be remarked that there is already
a number of studies concerned with paraconsistency in modal logic — for exam-
ple, the work of Joa˜o Marcos in Modal logic [23] and that of Torben Brau¨ner on
hybridization of Nelson’s logic N4 [11]. However none of them discusses a measure
of inconsistency in the models. Although it is an important issue, in this work
we do not discuss the proof-theoretical aspects of this new logic which combines
paraconsistency and hybrid logic; this topic is left for further research. For now,
the measure of inconsistency is the main issue addressed.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 reviews the introductory material to hybrid
logic, namely its syntax and semantics together with the notion of bisimulation
with constants. Then, section 3 presents quasi-hybrid (QH) logic, which can be
used to reason about knowledge bases represented by hybrid formulas. A measure
for the inconsistency of a hybrid theory is proposed. We give several examples to
4illustrate the main concepts. This approach allows us to discuss whether a source
is more consistent than other and by which degree. Bisimulation is discussed in
section 4. We conclude by summarizing the main achievements of this work and by
enumerating some topics for further research.
2. Hybrid Logic
Hybrid logic was introduced by Arthur Prior [25] in the 50’s. The theory was
significantly extended by his student Robert Bull. He developed a number of com-
pleteness results for generalizations of Prior’s hybrid logic. Some years later, in the
80’s, the Bulgarian school of logic (namely Passy, Tinchev, Gargov and Goranko)
revived the interest in hybrid logic, studying, in particular, the possible roles of the
binder operator. More recently, Areces and Blackburn expanded hugely the theory,
addressing in particular the complexity of the satisfiability problem. Hybrid logics
[8] are a brand of modal logics that provide appropriate syntax for the possible
worlds semantics through nominals. In particular, it adds to the modal description
of transition structures the ability to refer to specific states. If modal logics have
been successfully used for specifying reactive systems, the hybrid component adds
the possibility to refer to individual states and reason about the system’s local
behavior at each of them.
With hybrid logic we may express equality between states named by i and j
(@ij) or accessibility of the latter from the former through a modality (@i3j) or
a statement at a specific state (@iϕ). Moreover, hybrid logic is strictly more ex-
pressive than its modal fragment. For example, irreflexivity (i→ ¬3i), asymmetry
(i → ¬33i) or antisymmetry (i → 2(3i → i)) are properties of the underlying
transition structure which are simply not definable in standard modal logic (see [9]).
Note that for the propositional case the satisfiability problem is still decidable.
Another important feature that will be central in our approach is the fact that
basic hybrid logic can specify Robinson Diagrams. Namely, @ip says that the
proposition p is true at the state named by i, while ¬@ip (logically equivalent
to @i¬p) denies this ; @ij says that the states named by i and j are identical,
while ¬@ij (logically equivalent to @i¬j) states that they are distinct ; finally,
@i3j says that the state named by j is a successor of the state named by i, and
¬@i3j (logically equivalent to @i2¬j) denies this. Consequently, in hybrid logic
we are able to completely describe models. This way of looking at models as sets
of formulas will be useful to measure the contradictions in a model, analogously to
the quasi-classical case.
2.1. The basic hybrid language. We start by presenting the simplest form of
hybrid logic: the basic hybrid language. The basic hybrid language introduces
nominals and the satisfaction operator into the propositional modal logic. Although
being a simple extension, it carries great power in terms of expressivity.
Definition 2.1. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type where Prop is a
set of propositional symbols and Nom is a set disjoint from Prop. We use p, q, r, etc.
to refer to the elements in Prop. The elements in Nom are called nominals and
we typically write them as i, j, k, etc.. The set of well-formed formulas over L,
Form@(L), is defined by the following grammar:
WFF := i | p | ⊥ | > | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ ∧ ψ | 3ϕ | 2ϕ | @iϕ
5For any nominal i, @i is called a satisfaction operator.
Definition 2.2. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type. A hybrid struc-
ture H over L is a tuple (W,R,N, V ). Here, W is a non-empty set called domain
whose elements are called states or worlds, and R is a binary relation such that
R ⊆ W ×W and is called the accessibility relation. N : Nom → W is a function
called hybrid nomination that assigns nominals to elements in W such that for any
nominal i, N(i) is the element of W named by i. We call this element the denota-
tion of i under N . V is a hybrid valuation, which means that V is a function with
domain Prop and range Pow(W ) such that V (p) tells us at which states (if any)
each propositional symbol is true.
The pair (W,R) is called the frame underlying H and H is said to be a structure
based on this frame.
We define a homomorphism between hybrid structures by considering them as
first-order structures. Concretely,
Definition 2.3. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type, H =
(W,R,N, V ) and H′ = (W ′, R′, N ′, V ′) be two hybrid structures over L. A ho-
momorphism h from H to H′ is a map h : W →W ′ such that
(1) for any p ∈ Prop and any w ∈W , w ∈ V (p) iff h(w) ∈ V ′(p);
(2) for any i ∈ Nom, h(N(i)) = N ′(i);
(3) for any w, s ∈W , wRs implies that h(w)R′h(s).
We say that h is an embedding if it is injective and the condition (3) holds in
the strong version:
for any w, s ∈W , wRs iff h(w)R′h(s).
The satisfaction relation, which is defined as follows, is a generalization of Kripke-
style satisfaction.
Definition 2.4 (Satisfaction). The local satisfaction relation |= between a hybrid
structure H = (W,R,N, V ), a state w ∈ W and a hybrid formula is recursively
defined by:
(1) H, w |= i iff w = N(i);
(2) H, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p);
(3) H, w |= ⊥ never;
(4) H, w |= > always;
(5) H, w |= ¬ϕ iff not H, w |= ϕ;
(6) H, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff H, w |= ϕ and H, w |= ψ;
(7) H, w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff H, w |= ϕ or H, w |= ψ;
(8) H, w |= 3ϕ iff ∃w′ ∈W (wRw′ and H, w′ |= ϕ);
(9) H, w |= 2ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈W (wRw′ ⇒ H, w′ |= ϕ);
(10) H, w |= @iϕ iff H, w′ |= ϕ, where w′ = N(i);
If H, w |= ϕ we say that ϕ is satisfied in H at w. If ϕ is satisfied at all states
in a structure H, we write H |= ϕ. If ϕ is satisfied at all states in all structures
based on a frame F , then we say that ϕ is valid on F and we write F |= ϕ. If ϕ
is valid on all frames, then we simply say that ϕ is valid and we write |= ϕ. For
∆ ⊆ Form@(L), we say that H is a model of ∆ iff for all θ ∈ ∆H |= θ.
6It is easy to see that boolean connectives have the usual properties, and that 2ϕ
is equivalent to ¬3¬ϕ.
Definition 2.5. A formula ϕ∗ ∈ Form@(L) is said to be (logically) equivalent to
ϕ ∈ Form@(L) iff for every hybrid structure H = (W,R,N, V ), for all w ∈W ,
H, w |= ϕ⇔ H, w |= ϕ∗.
We should point out that this notion of equivalence satisfies the replacement
property. This fact will be important later, in the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Next lemma states some properties about the satisfaction operator that will be
important in the sequel.
Lemma 2.6. Let ϕ,ψ be hybrid formulas. Then,
(1) @i(ϕ ∨ ψ) is equivalent to @iϕ ∨@iψ;
(2) @i(ϕ ∧ ψ) is equivalent to @iϕ ∧@iψ;
(3) @i@jϕ is equivalent to @jϕ;
(4) ¬@iϕ is equivalent to @i¬ϕ;
(5) @i(ϕ1 ∧ψ1)∨@i(ϕ2 ∧ψ2) is equivalent to (@iϕ1 ∨@iϕ2)∧ (@iϕ1 ∨@iψ2)∧
(@iψ1 ∨@iϕ2) ∧ (@iψ1 ∨@iψ2).
2.2. Hybrid diagrams. In order to define the diagram of a hybrid structure , we
have to define first the concept of literal.
Definition 2.7. For a hybrid similarity type L = 〈Prop,Nom〉, we define
(1) Hybrid atoms over L:
HAt(L) = {@ip, @ij, @i3j | i, j ∈ Nom, p ∈ Prop}
(2) Hybrid literals over L:
HLit(L) = {@ip, @i¬p, @ij, @i¬j,@i3j, @i2¬j | i, j ∈ Nom, p ∈ Prop}
An important feature of hybrid logic is the fact that we can specify Robinson
diagrams [7]. As in first-order logic, in order to define the diagram of a hybrid
structure, we expand the hybrid similarity type L by adding new nominals for the
elements of the domain W . We write L(W ) for this new hybrid similarity type; in
other words, L(W ) = 〈Prop,Nom ∪W 〉.
Given a hybrid structure H = (W,R,N, V ) over L, we denote by H(W ) the
natural expansion of H to L(W ) by taking N the identity on the new symbols.
The diagram of a hybrid structure H over L is the set of literals over L(W ) that
are valid in H(W ). Formally,
Definition 2.8. For a hybrid similarity type, L = 〈Prop,Nom〉, and a hybrid
structure over L, H = (W,R,N, V ), the elementary diagram of H, diag(H), is the
set of hybrid literals over L(W ) that hold in H(W ), i.e.,
diag(H) = {α ∈ HLit(L(W )) | H(W ) |= α}
Actually, diag(H) behaves like the standard diagram for first-order logic:
Theorem 2.9. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type, H = (W,R,N, V ),
and H′ = (W ′, R′, N ′, V ′) be two hybrid structures over L. Then, there is an
embedding from H to H′ iff H′ can be expanded to a model of diag(H).
7Proof. Let h be an embedding from H to H′.
Define the expansion H′h = (W ′, R′, N ′h, V ′) of H′ to L(W ) by extending N to
Nom∪W by N ′h(w) = h(w) for w ∈W . It is not hard to show that H′h is a model
of the diagram of H.
Conversely, let H′ = (W ′, R′, N¯ , V ′) be an expansion of H′ to L(W ) which is a
model of the diagram of H. Define the map h : W →W ′ by h(w) = N¯(w). Clearly,
h is injective. Moreover, it is not difficult to see that h is a homomorphism. Hence,
it is an embedding. 
Example 1. Let L = 〈{p, q}, {}〉, and W = {u, v, w}.
Consider the hybrid structure H represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. A hybrid structure.
The diagram of H is given by:
diag(H) = {@up,@u¬q,@v¬p,@vq,@wp,@wq,
@uu,@vv,@ww,
@u¬v,@u¬w,@v¬u,@v¬w,@w¬u,@w¬v,
@u3v,@u2¬u,@u2¬w,@v3w,@v2¬u,
@v2¬w,@w2¬u,@w2¬v,@w2¬w}
2.3. Bisimulation. In this section we recall the notion of bisimulation of hybrid
structures, sometimes called bisimulation with constants.
Definition 2.10 (Bisimulation). Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type.
Let H = (W,R,N, V ) and H′ = (W ′, R′, N ′, V ′) be two hybrid structures. A
bisimulation between H and H′ is a non-empty relation Z ⊆W ×W ′ such that:
• All points named by nominals are related by Z, i.e., for each i ∈ Nom
N(i)ZN ′(i);
• for every pair (w,w′) ∈ Z we have:
– Atomic conditions:
∗ w ∈ V (p) iff w′ ∈ V ′(p), for all p ∈ Prop.
∗ for all i ∈ Nom, N(i) = w iff N ′(i) = w′.
– if wRu for some u ∈ W , then there is some u′ ∈ W ′ such that w′R′u′
and uZu′ (Zig),
8– Similarly, in the opposite direction: if w′R′u′ for some u′ ∈ W ′, then
there is some u ∈W such that wRu and uZu′ (Zag).
Two pointed hybrid structures, (H, w) and (H′, w′), are bisimilar if there is a
bisimulation Z between H and H′ such that wZw′.
It is well known that modal satisfaction is invariant under bisimulation.
Theorem 2.11 ([27]). Hybrid logic is invariant under bisimulation: let L be a hy-
brid similarity type; If two pointed hybrid structures (H, w) and (H′, w′) are bisim-
ilar, then for any ϕ ∈ Form@(L),
(H, w) |= ϕ iff (H′, w′) |= ϕ.
3. Paraconsistency in Hybrid Logic
In this section we study paraconsistency in Hybrid logic following an approach
inspired by the work of Grant and Hunter ([19, 20]). First of all, we define a
Quasi-hybrid (QH) Basic Logic. Analogously to the assumption in [19], where it is
assumed that all formulas are in Prenex Conjunctive Normal Form, we will assume
that all formulas are in Negation Normal Form. This assumption does not lead
to loss of generality since in Proposition 3.2 we show that any hybrid formula is
equivalent to a formula in negation normal form.
Concepts of bistructure, decoupled and strong satisfaction and QH model will
be presented. We define the paraconsistent diagram of a bistructure and we prove
a very important theorem concerning the construction of QH models, which are
sets of quasi-hybrid literals, whose definition will also be introduced. Afterwards,
we consider minimal QH models and we present some examples with illustrations.
The inconsistency measure, the central goal of this paper, is introduced and,
consequently, the notion of preferred QH model appears. We define the extrinsic
and intrinsic inconsistency for preferred QH models, and we present some analogous
results to the ones in [19].
3.1. Quasi-hybrid Basic Logic. In order to generalize the approach in [19] to the
hybrid case, we have to consider formulas in negation normal form (i.e., formulas in
which the negation symbol occurs immediately before propositional symbols and/or
nominals).
We define the notion of negation normal form for hybrid logic and we establish
an analogous result to the one in [10] for classical propositional logic that states
that any modal formula is logically equivalent to one in the negation normal form;
we would also like to point out that the same result was presented without proof
in [17] for the modal case. Therefore we can restrict our attention to formulas in
negation normal form.
Definition 3.1. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type. The negation
normal form of a formula, for short NNF, is defined just as in propositional logic: a
formula is said to be in NNF if negation only appears directly before propositional
variables and/or nominals. The set of NNF formulas over L, FormNNF(@)(L), is
recursively defined as follows:
For p ∈ Prop, i ∈ Nom,
9(1) ⊥,> are in NNF;
(2) p, i, ¬p, ¬i are in NNF;
(3) If ϕ, ψ are formulas in NNF, then ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ are in NNF;
(4) If ϕ is in NNF, then 2ϕ, 3ϕ are in NNF;
(5) If ϕ is in NNF, then @iϕ is in NNF.
The next proposition states that we can consider only formulas in negation nor-
mal form.
Proposition 3.2. Every formula ϕ ∈ Form@(L) is logically equivalent to a formula
ϕ∗ ∈ FormNNF(@)(L).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base step is trivial,
since an atomic formula is already in negation normal form. The cases of conjunc-
tions, disjunctions and the {2,3,@}-prefixed formulas are also trivial.
The non-trivial case is to prove that if A is equivalent to the negation normal
form A∗ then ¬A is equivalent to some negation normal form A†. This divides into
seven subcases according to the form of A∗. The case where A∗ is atomic is trivial,
since we may simply let A† be ¬A∗. In case A∗ is of form ¬B, so ¬A∗ is ¬¬B, we
may let A† be B. In case A∗ is of form B∨C, so ¬A∗ is ¬(B∨C), which is logically
equivalent to (¬B∧¬C), by the induction hypothesis the simpler formulas ¬B and
¬C are equivalent to formulas B† and C† of the required form, so we may let A†
be (B† ∧C†). The case of conjunction is similar. In case A∗ is of form 3B, so that
¬A∗ is ¬3B, which is logically equivalent to 2¬B, by the induction hypothesis
the simpler formula ¬B is equivalent to a formula B† of the required form, so we
may let A† be 2B†. The case of box is similar. If A∗ is of the form @iB, so that
¬A∗ is ¬@iB, which is logically equivalent to @i¬B, and since by hypothesis ¬B
is equivalent to a formula B† of the required form, then we can conclude that A†
is @iB
†. 
Based on this proof, a recursive procedure that puts formulas in negation normal
form can be formulated. Formally, nnf : Form@(L) → FormNNF(@)(L) is defined
as follows:
(1) nnf(l)
def
= l, if l is a literal;
(2) nnf(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) def= nnf(ψ1) ∨ nnf(ψ2);
(3) nnf(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) def= nnf(ψ1) ∧ nnf(ψ2);
(4) nnf(¬(ψ1 ∨ ψ2)) def= nnf(¬ψ1) ∧ nnf(¬ψ2);
(5) nnf(¬(ψ1 ∧ ψ2)) def= nnf(¬ψ1) ∨ nnf(¬ψ2);
(6) nnf(2ψ)
def
= 2nnf(ψ);
(7) nnf(¬2ψ) def= 3nnf(¬ψ);
(8) nnf(3ψ)
def
= 3nnf(ψ);
(9) nnf(¬3ψ) def= 2nnf(¬ψ);
(10) nnf(¬¬ψ) def= nnf(ψ);
(11) nnf(@iψ)
def
= @innf(ψ);
(12) nnf(¬@iψ) def= @innf(¬ψ);
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Without loss of generality (see Theorem 3.2), we will assume that all formulas
are in negation normal form, i.e, given a hybrid similarity type L = 〈Prop,Nom〉,
the set of formulas is FormNNF(@)(L).
Definition 3.3. Let θ be a formula in NNF. We define the complementation
operation ∼ from ∼ θ := nnf(¬θ).
The ∼ operator is not part of the object hybrid similarity type but it makes
some definitions clearer.
Recall that a hybrid structure for a hybrid similarity type L is a tuple
(W,R,N, V ). However, in order to accommodate contradictions in a model, we
will use two valuations for propositions: V + and V −.
Definition 3.4. A hybrid bistructure is a tuple (W,R,N, V +, V −), where (W,R,N, V +)
and (W,R,N, V −) are hybrid structures.
The map V + is interpreted as the acceptance of a propositional symbol, and V −
as the rejection. This is formalized in the definition of decoupled satisfaction.
Definition 3.5. For a hybrid bistructure E = (W,R,N, V +, V −) we define a sat-
isfiability relation |=d called decoupled satisfaction at w ∈ W for propositional
symbols and nominals as follows:
(1) E,w |=d p iff w ∈ V +(p);
(2) E,w |=d i iff w = N(i);
(3) E,w |=d ¬p iff w ∈ V −(p);
(4) E,w |=d ¬i iff w 6= N(i);
Since we allow both a positive and a negative propositional symbol to be satis-
fiable, we have decoupled, at the level of the structure, the link between a formula
and its negation. In contrast, if a classical hybrid structure satisfies a propositional
symbol at some world, it is forced to not satisfy its negation at that world.
This decoupling gives us the basis for a semantic for paraconsistent reasoning.
Definition 3.6. A satisfiability relation |=s, called strong satisfaction, is defined
as follows:
(1) E,w |=s > always;
(2) E,w |=s ⊥ never;
(3) E,w |=s p iff E,w |=d p;
(4) E,w |=s ¬p iff E,w |=d ¬p;
(5) E,w |=s i iff E,w |=d i;
(6) E,w |=s ¬i iff E,w |=d ¬i;
(7) E,w |=s θ1 ∨ θ2 iff [E,w |=s θ1 or E,w |=s θ2] and [E,w |=s∼ θ1 ⇒
E,w |=s θ2] and [E,w |=s∼ θ2 ⇒ E,w |=s θ1];
(8) E,w |=s θ1 ∧ θ2 iff E,w |=s θ1 and E,w |=s θ2;
(9) E,w |=s 3θ iff ∃w′(wRw′ & E,w′ |=s θ);
(10) E,w |=s 2θ iff ∀w′(wRw′ ⇒ E,w′ |=s θ);
(11) E,w |=s @iθ iff E,w′ |=s θ where w′ = N(i);
We define strong validity as follows:
E |=s θ iff for all w ∈W, E,w |=s θ.
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3.2. Quasi-hybrid Models. Analogously to the definition in the basic hybrid case
of a model of a set ∆ of formulas, we say that a bistructure E is a quasi-hybrid
model of ∆ iff for all θ ∈ ∆, E |=s θ.
To make it easier to follow, we will assume that N maps nominals to themselves;
henceW will always contain all the nominals in L. This also means that all nominals
are mapped to distinct elements, i.e., N is an inclusion map. Hence, for a given
hybrid similarity type L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 and a domain W of a bistructure we must
have Nom ⊆W .
As we pointed out before, hybrid logic can specify Robinson diagrams. Following
our assumption that N is injective, in order to define diagrams we do not need the
hybrid literals regarding equality between nominals, i.e., @ij, @i¬j. Therefore, in
this context, we reformulate the notion of atom and literal as follows:
Definition 3.7. For a hybrid similarity type L = 〈Prop,Nom〉,
(1) QH atoms over L:
QHAt(L) = {@ip, @i3j | i, j ∈ Nom, p ∈ Prop};
(2) QH literals over L:
QHLit(L) = {@ip, @i¬p, @i3j, @i2¬j | i, j ∈ Nom, p ∈ Prop};
To build the paraconsistent diagram, we add new nominals for the elements of
W which are not named yet, and we denote this expanded similarity type by L(W ),
i.e., L(W ) = 〈Prop,W 〉 (recall that Nom ⊆ W ). As in the standard case, E(W )
denotes the natural expansion of the bistructure E to the hybrid similarity type
L(W ), by taking N the identity for the new nominals. Moreover, we will assume
that Prop and Nom are finite sets for any hybrid similarity type L = 〈Prop,Nom〉,
as well as the domain W of any bistructure.
Definition 3.8. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type, and E =
(W,R,N, V +, V −) be a hybrid bistructure over L. The elementary paraconsis-
tent diagram of E, denoted by Pdiag(E), is the set of quasi-hybrid literals over
L(W ) that hold in E(W ), i.e.,
Pdiag(E) = {α ∈ QHLit(L(W )) | E(W ) |=s α}
The paraconsistent diagram Pdiag(E) defines the bistructure E in the sense
that two distinct bistructures over L, with the same domain W and N , induce two
distinct paraconsistent diagrams (over L(W )). Therefore, in the sequel, we will
represent a (finite) bistructure E = (W,R,N, V +, V −) by its (finite) paraconsis-
tent diagram Pdiag(E). This syntactic representation will play an important role
throughout this paper.
Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type, ∆ ⊆ FormNNF(@)(L) and
W a finite set. We write QH(L,∆,W ) to denote the set of representations (i.e.,
paraconsistent diagrams) of hybrid bistructures that are models of ∆ with domain
W . Recall that the domain and the hybrid similarity type are considered to be finite.
This implies that the bistructures are finite and consequently the representations of
QH models are also finite. This fact is relevant in the next section when discussing
the measure of inconsistency of a model.
The syntactic representations of models will be denoted byM,M1, etc. LetM
be the representation of E with domain W . For w ∈ W , we write M, w |=s ϕ if
E,w |=s ϕ. Analogously, we write M |=s ϕ if E |=s ϕ.
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3.3. Construction of Syntactic QH Models. In order to make it easier to con-
struct QH models as sets of quasi-hybrid literals, we will prove some properties
about the satisfaction operator, and we will introduce a very important theorem
which will make it possible to use only quasi-hybrid literals when transforming a for-
mula in negation normal form into a quasi-equivalent positive boolean combination
of QH-literals.
Definition 3.9. A formula ϕ∗ ∈ FormNNF(@)(L) is said to be quasi-equivalent
to a formula ϕ ∈ FormNNF(@)(L), denoted ϕ ≡q ϕ∗, iff for all hybrid bistructure
E = (W,R,N, V +, V −) and any w ∈W ,
E,w |=s ϕ⇔ E,w |=s ϕ∗.
We now present some properties of the satisfaction operator in quasi-hybrid logic:
Lemma 3.10. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type, and ϕ,ψ ∈
FormNNF(@)(L) be hybrid formulas in negation normal form. Then,
(1) @i(ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡q @iϕ ∨@iψ;
(2) @i(ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡q @iϕ ∧@iψ;
(3) @i@jϕ ≡q @jϕ;
(4) ¬@iϕ ≡q @i¬ϕ.
Proof. (1) Let E be an arbitrary bistructure, and w be an arbitrary world in E:
E,w |=s @i(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ E,w′ |=s ϕ ∨ ψ,w′ = N(i)
⇔ [E,w′ |=s ϕ or E,w′ |=s ψ]
and [E,w′ |=s nnf(¬ϕ)⇒ E,w′ |=s ψ]
and [E,w′ |=s nnf(¬ψ)⇒ E,w′ |=s ϕ], w′ = N(i)
⇔ [E,w |=s @iϕ or E,w |=s @iψ]
and [E,w |=s @i(nnf(¬ϕ))⇒ E,w |=s @iψ]
and [E,w |=s @i(nnf(¬ψ))⇒ E,w |=s @iϕ]
⇔ [E,w |=s @iϕ or E,w |=s @iψ]
and [E,w |=s nnf(¬(@iϕ))⇒ E,w |=s @iψ]
and [E,w |=s nnf(¬(@iψ))⇒ E,w |=s @iϕ]
⇔ E,w |=s @iϕ ∨@iψ

The distributive law does not hold as shown in the following example.
Example 2. Let L = 〈{p, q, r}, {i}〉 be a hybrid similarity type. Consider the
bistructure E, with domain W = {i}, R = ∅ and the valuation V defined by
V +(p) = ∅, V −(p) = {i}, V +(q) = V −(q) = {i}, V +(r) = {i}, V −(r) = ∅.
Clearly, the formula @ip ∨ (@iq ∧ @ir) is valid in E. However, the formula
(@ip ∨ @iq) ∧ (@ip ∨ @ir) is not valid in E. This shows that in Quasi-Hybrid
Logic the distributive law does not hold.
For the representation of bistructures using quasi-hybrid literals, consider that
L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 is a hybrid similarity type, andM is the representation of a finite
bistructure over L with domain W .
We start by noticing that, with a finite domain W = {i1, i2, . . . , in}, for any
formula ϕ ∈ FormNNF(@)L, we have
M |=s ϕ⇔M |=s @i1ϕ ∧@i2ϕ ∧ · · · ∧@inϕ.
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Since the conjunction of positive boolean combinations of quasi-hybrid literals
remains a positive boolean combination of quasi-hybrid literals, we define a pro-
cedure that transforms any formula @i∗ϕ in a quasi-equivalent positive boolean
combination of quasi-hybrid literals, PBCL for short, in the following way:
• if ϕ = p,@i∗p is a PBCL;
• if ϕ = ¬p,@i∗¬p is a PBCL;
• if ϕ = i,@i∗i is quasi-equivalent to
{ >, if i = i∗
⊥, if i 6= i∗ which is a PBCL;
• if ϕ = ¬i,@i∗¬i is quasi-equivalent to
{ >, if i 6= i∗
⊥, if i = i∗ which is a PBCL;
For the induction step, suppose that @i∗φ,@i∗ψ are equivalent to PBCL formu-
las. Then,
• if ϕ = φ ∨ ψ, @i∗φ ∨ ψ is quasi-equivalent to @i∗φ ∨ @i∗ψ which by Ind.
Hyp. is quasi-equivalent to a PBCL;
• if ϕ = φ ∧ ψ, @i∗φ ∧ ψ is quasi-equivalent to @i∗φ ∧ @i∗ψ which by Ind.
Hyp. is quasi-equivalent to a PBCL;
• if ϕ = 2φ, @i∗2φ is quasi-equivalent to (@i∗2¬i1 ∨ @i1φ) ∧ (@i∗2¬i2 ∨
@i2φ)∧ ...∧ (@i∗2¬in ∨@inφ) which by Ind. Hyp. is quasi-equivalent to a
PBCL;
• if ϕ = 3φ, @i∗3φ is quasi-equivalent to (@i∗3i1∧@i1φ)∨(@i∗3i2∧@i2φ)∨
... ∨ (@i∗3in ∧@inφ) which by Ind. Hyp. is quasi-equivalent to a PBCL;
• if ϕ = @ikφ, @i∗@ikφ is quasi-equivalent to @ikφ which by Ind. Hyp. is
quasi-equivalent to a PBCL.
As we have already pointed out, we can syntactically represent bistructures as
paraconsistent diagrams and thus we want to build models as sets of quasi-hybrid
literals. So, for a given set ∆, it is easier to decompose each formula into quasi-
hybrid literals using this procedure, and then construct the model upon those lit-
erals.
It is simple to prove that the procedure works and produces quasi-equivalent
formulas. Formally,
Theorem 3.11. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type and M be a
representation of a finite bistructure over L with domain W . For any formula
ϕ ∈ FormNNF(@)(L), it holds that:
M |=s ϕ⇔M |=s ϕ
for ϕ a PBCL which is the result of applying the previous procedure to ϕ.
3.3.1. Minimal QH Models. The next definition will be the basis to prove that we
can deal only with models with the least number of elements:
Definition 3.12. Let L be a hybrid similarity type. For a set K of QH models,
the set of satisfied literals in K is the set SLit(K) defined as follows:
SLit(K) = {α ∈ QHLit(L(W )) | ∀M ∈ K, M |=s α}
Since different hybrid similarity types contain different sets of formulas, it will
be useful to have L as a parameter when we discuss concepts about models. Also,
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we will assume that ∆ is a set of formulas of L. The domain is also important and
we consider it as a parameter.
Models with the least number of elements are now defined:
Definition 3.13. Let L be a hybrid similarity type, ∆ ⊆ FormNNF(@)(L) and W
be a non-empty set. The set of minimal QH models of ∆ with domain W is the set
MQH(L,∆,W ), defined as:
MQH(L,∆,W ) = {M ∈ QH(L,∆,W ) | if M′ ⊂M then M′ /∈ QH(L,∆,W )}
Clearly, every QH model contains a minimal QH model, i.e., for all QH model
M1, there is a minimal QH model M2 such that M2 ⊆M1.
It is not difficult to see that, if a variable p ∈ Prop does not occur in ∆ then, p
also does not occur in any model M∈ MQH(L,∆,W ).
Minimal QH models are just models without irrelevant and useless information,
according to the next theorem:
Theorem 3.14. Let L be a hybrid similarity type, ∆ ⊆ FormNNF(@)(L) and W a
non-empty set. Then
SLit(QH(L,∆,W )) = SLit(MQH(L,∆,W ))
Proof. Since MQH(L,∆,W ) ⊆ QH(L,∆,W ), by the Galois Connection, we have
that SLit(QH(L,∆,W )) ⊆ SLit(MQH(L,∆,W )).
To prove the other inclusion, let ϕ ∈ SLit(MQH(L,∆,W )). So, Mi |=s ϕ, for
all Mi ∈ MQH(L,∆,W ).
For all M′j ∈ QH(L,∆,W ), there is a subset Nj ⊆ QHLit(L(W )) and a model
Mi ∈ MQH(L,∆,W ) such that Mi ∪ Nj = M′j . Since Mi |=s ϕ, for all
Mi ∈ MQH(L,∆,W ), then Mi ∪ Nj |=s ϕ, for all Mi ∈ MQH(L,∆,W ) and
any Nj ⊆ QHLit(L(W )). So, M′j |=s ϕ, for all M′j ∈ QH(L,∆,W ). Therefore,
SLit(MQH(L,∆,W )) ⊆ SLit(QH(L,∆,W )).
Thus SLit(QH(L,∆,W )) = SLit(MQH(L,∆,W )). 
The previous theorem does not hold if we consider all satisfied formulas, say
SForm(K), instead of only satisfied literals. We would have the following counter-
example:
Example 3. Let L = ({p, q, r}, {i, j}), W = {i, j} and ∆ = {@ip ∨ @iq,@i¬p ∨
@i¬q,@jr}.
The two minimal QH models of ∆ are:
M1 = {@ip,@i¬q,@jr};
M2 = {@iq,@i¬p,@jr}.
It is easy to see that:
@ir ∨@jr ∈ SForm(MQH(L,∆,W )).
However, @ir ∨ @jr /∈ SForm(QH(L,∆,W )). In fact, if we consider the model
M = {@ip,@i¬q,@jr,@j¬r}, we have thatM 2s @ir∨@jr (this happens because
M |=s ¬@jr implies that M would have to satisfy @ir, which is false). Thus
SForm(MQH(L,∆,W )) * SForm(QH(L,∆,W )).
Next we will present several examples that illustrate how to build models (which
are sets of quasi-hybrid literals) for a set of formulas ∆, using Theorem 3.11.
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Example 4. Let L = 〈{p, q}, {i}〉, W = {i}, and ∆ = {@i(p ∧ q),@i¬p}.
First we notice that the formula @i(p∧q) is quasi-equivalent to @ip∧@iq. Hence,
any minimal model of ∆ must contain the set Ω = {@i¬p,@iq,@ip}.
Observe that in a minimal model all transitions (or their lack) between states
must be specified, hence we have to explore all possible transitions in W = {i}. We
have exactly two minimal QH models of ∆:
M1 = {@i¬p,@iq,@ip,@i2¬i};
M2 = {@i¬p,@iq,@ip,@i3i}.
The minimal models M1 and M2 are represented in Figure 2a, and 2b, respec-
tively:
(a) M1. (b) M2.
Figure 2. Minimal models – Example 4.
In this example the minimal models have the same number of contradictions.
However this is not always the case as we will see below.
Example 5. Let L = 〈{p, q}, {i, j}〉, W = {i, j}, and ∆ = {p ∨ q,@i¬p}.
Not all formulas in ∆ are PBCLs. Using the properties of the satisfaction op-
erator and the method described in the proof of Theorem 3.11, let us make the
necessary adjustments:
(1) p ∨ q ≡q (@i(p ∨ q)) ∧ (@j(p ∨ q)) ≡q (@ip ∨@iq) ∧ (@jp ∨@jq)
Since the formula @i¬p is mandatory in every model, from (@ip ∨ @iq) fol-
lows that @iq is mandatory too. The formula (@jp ∨ @jq) is going to be split
into two, since there is no restriction to which component consider. Hence, any
minimal model of ∆ must contain one of these sets: Ω1 = {@i¬p,@iq,@jp} or
Ω2 = {@i¬p,@iq,@jq}.
As pointed out before, all connections (or lack of them) must be specified in
minimal QH models. We will leave some examples of minimal QH models for
the considered similarity type L, set of formulas ∆, and domain W , in a total
of 22×2 = 24 = 16 possibilities, by combining quasi-hybrid literals of the form
@i3j,@i2¬j.
We have for instance, for Ω1:
M1 = {@i¬p,@iq,@jp,@i2¬i,@i2¬j,@j2¬i,@j2¬j};
M2 = {@i¬p,@iq,@jp,@i2¬i,@i3j,@j3i,@j2¬j}.
And for Ω2:
M3 = {@i¬p,@iq,@jq,@i2¬i,@i2¬j,@j2¬i,@j2¬j};
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M4 = {@i¬p,@iq,@jq, ,@i2¬i,@i3j,@j3i,@j2¬j}.
The minimal models M1,M2,M3 and M4 are represented in Figures 3a, 3b,
3c and 3d, respectively.
(a) The minimal modelM1. (b) The minimal modelM2.
(c) The minimal modelM3. (d) The minimal modelM4.
Figure 3. Minimal models – Example 5.
Example 6. Let L = 〈{p, q}, {i, j}〉, W = {i, j, k}, and ∆ = {@i(p∧ q),@j(¬p∧p)}.
None of the formulas in ∆ are PBCLs. Let us rearrange it:
(1) @i(p ∧ q) ≡q @ip ∧@iq
(2) @j(¬p ∧ p) ≡q @j¬p ∧@jp
The set of formulas that are satisfiable in all minimal QH model is: Ω =
{@ip,@iq,@jp,@j¬p}.
One minimal model for ∆ is, for example:
M = {@ip,@iq,@jp,@j¬p,@i2¬i,@i2¬j,@i2¬k,
@j2¬i,@j2¬j,@j2¬k,@k2¬i,@k2¬j,@k2¬k}
The minimal model M is represented in Figure 4:
Figure 4. Minimal model M – Example 6.
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Example 7. Let L = 〈{p}, {i}〉, W = {i} and ∆ = {@i2¬p,@i2p}.
There are exactly two minimal QH models with domain W = {i}, which are:
M1 = {@i2¬i};
M2 = {@i3i,@ip,@i¬p}.
The minimal models M1 and M2 are represented in Figures 5a and 5b, respec-
tively:
(a) M1. (b) M2.
Figure 5. Minimal models – Example 7.
Example 8. Let L = 〈{p, q, r}, {i, j}〉, W = {i, j}, and ∆ = {@i3j∨@j3i,@i3(p∨
q),@i2q,@i2¬j,@i¬q}.
Some formulas in ∆ are not written as a PBCL. We will make the necessary
adjustments:
(1) @i3(p ∨ q) ≡q @i3(p ∨ q) ≡q (@i3i ∧@i(p ∨ q)) ∨ (@i3j ∧@j(p ∨ q));
(2) @i2q ≡q (@i2¬i ∨@iq) ∧ (@i2¬j ∨@jq).
There is a set of formulas that are true in every minimal model, which is: Ω =
{@i2¬j,@j3i,@i3i,@iq,@i¬q,@ip}.
Again, although we already have some information about transitions between
states, we need to complete it in order to have information about all connections
(or their lack) between pairs of states. The only pair left is the pair (j, j). We have
two possibilities: the connection exists, or it does not.
So, we have the following QH minimal models:
M1 = {@i2¬j,@j3i,@i3i,@iq,@i¬q,@ip,@j3j};
M2 = {@i2¬j,@j3i,@i3i,@iq,@i¬q,@ip,@j2¬j}.
The minimal models M1 and M2 are represented in Figures 6a and 6b, respec-
tively:
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(a) M1. (b) M2.
Figure 6. Minimal models – Example 8.
Our interest in using MQH(L,∆,W ) rather than QH(L,∆,W ), for a set of for-
mulas ∆, is that the models in MQH(L,∆,W ) do not contain irrelevant information
for analysing inconsistency, and we do not lose any useful information.
3.4. The Inconsistency Measure. A theory may have different minimal QH
models depending on the hybrid similarity type and domain considered. Now we
will introduce a way to measure the inconsistency of a QH model. This measure
is a ratio between 0 and 1 whose numerator is the number of contradictions in the
model, and whose denominator is the total possible number of contradictions in the
underlying hybrid similarity type.
The measure of inconsistency of a model is crucial in a diverse range of applica-
tions in artificial intelligence to compare between knowledge bases. As supported
in [21], it may be a useful tool in analysing various information types, such as news
reports, software specifications, integrity constraints and e-commerce protocols.
To make the notation in the next definition simpler, we define the set of incon-
sistency literals over L and W as
IL(L,W ) = {@ip | i ∈W,p ∈ Prop}
Definition 3.15. For a QH model M,
Conflictbase(M) = {@ip ∈ IL(L,W ) | @ip ∈M & @i¬p ∈M}
Our inconsistency measure comes as follows:
Definition 3.16. The measure of inconsistency for a modelM in the context of a
hybrid similarity type L and domain W is given by the ModelInc function, giving
a value between 0 and 1, as follows:
ModelInc(M, L,W ) = |Conflictbase(M)||IL(L,W )|
The ModelInc is anti-monotonic in the following sense:
Theorem 3.17. Let L1, L2 be hybrid similarity types and W1,W2 non-empty sets.
Then,
• If L1 ⊆ L2 then ModelInc(M, L1,W ) ≥ModelInc(M, L2,W )
• If W1 ⊆W2 then ModelInc(M, L,W1) ≥ModelInc(M, L,W2)
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Example 9. In this example we will consider again the minimal models presented
in Examples 2-6 and we will compute their measures of inconsistency, i.e., the
ModelInc function.
(1) From Example 4, Conflictbase(M1) = {@ip}. Then,
ModelInc(M1, L,W ) = |Conflictbase(M1)||IL(L,W )| =
1
2
The same happens for M2.
(2) From Example 5, Conflictbase(M1) = {}. Then,
ModelInc(M1, L,W ) = |Conflictbase(M1)||IL(L,W )| =
0
4
= 0
The same happens for M2, M3 and M4.
(3) From Example 6, Conflictbase(M) = {@jp}. Then,
ModelInc(M, L,W ) = |Conflictbase(M)||IL(L,W )| =
1
4
(4) From Example 7, Conflictbase(M1) = {}. Then,
ModelInc(M1, L,W ) = |Conflictbase(M1)||IL(L,W )| =
0
1
= 0
However, for M2, Conflictbase(M2) = {@ip}. Hence,
ModelInc(M2, L,W ) = |Conflictbase(M1)||IL(L,W )| =
1
1
= 1
(5) From Example 8, Conflictbase(M1) = {}. Then,
ModelInc(M1, L,W ) = |Conflictbase(M1)||IL(L,W )| =
0
6
= 0
The same happens for M2.
An application where the measure of inconsistency has revealed itself useful in
the health area has been discussed in [13], and concerns the path of a patient in
the health care system, subject to contradictory diagnoses.
3.5. Preferred QH Models. We saw in Example 7 that minimal models for a
certain ∆, over the same hybrid similarity type and domain, may have different
number of contradictions and consequently the ModelInc function takes different
values for each model.
In order to consider minimal models with the least number of inconsistencies, we
restrict the class of minimal models by considering the so called class of preferred
models which are the ones with a minimal conflict base. This follows the approach
of Grant and Hunter in [19]. This idea was already adopted in the context of the
minimal four-valued logic [1].
Definition 3.18. Let L be a hybrid similarity type, ∆ ⊆ FormNNF(@)(L) and W a
non-empty set. The set of preferred QH models for ∆ with domain W is given by
PQH(L,∆,W ) = {M ∈ MQH(L,∆,W ) | for allM′ ∈ MQH(L,∆,W ),
|Conflictbase(M)| ≤ |Conflictbase(M′)|}
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Theorem 3.19. Let L be a hybrid similarity type, ∆ ⊆ FormNNF(@)(L) and W1,W2
non-empty sets with the same number of elements. If M1 ∈ PQH(L,∆,W1) and
M2 ∈ PQH(L,∆,W2), then ModelInc(M1, L,W1) = ModelInc(M2, L,W2).
Proof. Suppose that M1 ∈ PQH(L,∆,W1).
We construct a model M2 ∈ PQH(L,∆,W2) as follows:
• Define a bijective function F : W1 →W2 such that for all i ∈ Nom, F (i) = i.
• Write for each QH literal α ∈ L(W ), F (α) for the QH literal where each
i ∈W1 is replaced by F (i).
• Let M2 = {F (α) |α ∈M1}.
Clearly, M2 ∈ QH(L,∆,W2). M2 must also be minimal because if a proper
subset of M2 were a QH model, by applying F−1 we could obtain a QH model
with W1 for the domain, making M1 not minimal.
Similarly we can show that M2 is preferred. The result now follows. 
Now, for a hybrid similarity type L, we will define the extrinsic inconsistency of
a set of formulas ∆:
Definition 3.20. We define the extrinsic inconsistency of a theory ∆ in a hybrid
similarity type L, TheoryInc(∆, L), as a sequence 〈r1, . . . , rn, . . . 〉, where for all
n ≥ 1,
rn =
 ModelInc(M, L,Wn), if there is a model M∈ PQH(L,∆,Wn)with Wn a domain of size n;∗, otherwise.
We use ∗ as a kind of null value.
This sequence captures how the measure of inconsistency of a theory ∆ in a
hybrid similarity type L evolves with an increasing domain size. At one extreme,
there are cases where we do not have contradictions for any domain size; for example
for the trivial case when ∆ = ∅, TheoryInc(∆, L) = 〈0, 0, ...〉. At the other extreme,
there are theories ∆ such that TheoryInc(∆, L) = 〈1, 1, ...〉, such as ∆ = {p ∧ ¬p :
for all p ∈ Prop}.
Example 10. We leave some examples on the computation of the extrinsic incon-
sistency of some theories:
(1) Let L = 〈{p}, {i, j}〉 and ∆ = {@i¬p ∨@jp,@ip}.
TheoryInc(∆, L) = 〈∗, 0, 0, 0, ...〉
(2) Let L = 〈{p, q}, {i, j}〉 and ∆ = {@i(p ∧ q),@j(¬p ∧ p)}.
TheoryInc(∆, L) = 〈∗, 1
4
,
1
6
, ...〉
(3) Let L = 〈{p}, {i}〉 and ∆ = {@ip,@i¬p}.
TheoryInc(∆, L) = 〈1, 1
2
,
1
3
, ...〉
(4) Let L = 〈{p, q}, {i, j}〉 and ∆ = {@i¬p,@j¬q, p ∧ ¬p ∧ q}.
TheoryInc(∆, L) = 〈∗, 3
4
,
4
6
,
5
8
, ...〉
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(5) Let L = 〈{p}, {i, j}〉 and ∆ = {i ∨ j}.
TheoryInc(∆, L) = 〈∗, 0, ∗, ∗, ...〉
Some properties of TheoryInc are now announced and proved:
Proposition 3.21. Let L = 〈Nom,Prop〉 be a hybrid similarity type such that
|Nom| = k, ∆ ⊆ FormNNF(@)(L) and TheoryInc(∆, L) = 〈x1, x2, ...〉. Then,
• for all i such that 1 ≤ i < k, xi = ∗;
• if xk+1 6= ∗ then for all j > k, xj 6= ∗.
Proof. The reason for the asterisks from x1 to xk−1 is that the domain, according
to our definition, must have at least as many elements as the number of nominals
in L, |Nom|.
Suppose now that xk+1 6= ∗. Hence there is a preferred model M of ∆ with
domain W which has k + 1 elements.
Let u be a new element not in W , i.e. the element k+1, and let z be the element
of W that is not named by a nominal, i.e., the element k + 2. We define a new
modelM′ over L with domain W ∪{u}, which has cardinality k+ 2, admitting the
following representation:
M′ =M∪ {@u3w | w ∈W, @z3w ∈M} ∪ {@w2¬u | w ∈W} ∪
{@u2¬w | w ∈W, @z2¬w ∈M} ∪ {@up | p ∈ Prop, @zp ∈M} ∪
{@u¬p | p ∈ Prop, @z¬p ∈M}.
We claim that:
CLAIM: for all ϕ ∈ FormNNF(@)(L),
M, z |=s ϕ iff M′, u |=s ϕ and
M, z |=s∼ ϕ iff M′, u |=s∼ ϕ.
In fact, this can be proved by induction. The base step is trivial. The steps
for the conjunction, the satisfaction operator and the modal operators are also
straightforward. Let us see what happens with the disjunction:
Let ϕ := ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. We assume that the claim is true for formulas shorter than
ϕ (note that a formula ψ1 is shorter than a formula ψ2 iff the formula ψ1 contains
less boolean operators than the formula ψ2; however, the elements that compose
ψ1 are not necessarily the same elements that compose ψ2). Then,
M, z |= ϕ iff M, z |=s ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
iff [M, z |=s ϕ1 or M, z |=s ϕ2] and
[M, z |=s∼ ϕ2 ⇒M, z |=s ϕ1] and
[M, z |=s∼ ϕ1 ⇒M, z |=s ϕ2]
iff(∗) [M′, u |=s ϕ1 or M′, u |=s ϕ2] and
[M′, u |=s∼ ϕ1 ⇒M′, u |=s ϕ2] and
[M′, u |=s∼ ϕ2 ⇒M′, u |=s ϕ1]
The step (*) is by induction hypothesis.
As a consequence we have that M′ |=s ∆. And consequently xk+2 6= ∗.
This argument can be recursively applied. 
Proposition 3.22. Let L = 〈Nom,Prop〉 be a hybrid similarity type with |Nom| =
k, ∆ ⊆ FormNNF(@)(L) and TheoryInc(∆, L) = 〈x1, x2, ...〉. If xk+1 = 0 then for
all j > k + 1, xj = 0.
22
Proof. The same construction used in the previous proposition can also be applied
here. The model M′ obtained has 0 contradictions since M has 0 contradictions.

We can adopt a lexicographic ordering, denoted by the relation  over the tuples
generated by the TheoryInc function
Definition 3.23. Let L1 and L2 be hybrid similarity types and let ∆1,∆2 ⊆
FormNNF(@)(L). Let TheoryInc(∆1, L1) = 〈r1, r2, ...〉 and TheoryInc(∆2, L2) =
〈s1, s2, ...〉. We say that TheoryInc(∆1, L1)  TheoryInc(∆2, L2) iff for all i ≥
1, ri ≤ si or ri = ∗ or si = ∗.
TheoryInc(∆1, L1) ≺ TheoryInc(∆2, L2) abbreviates TheoryInc(∆1, L1) 
TheoryInc(∆2, L2) and TheoryInc(∆1, L1) 6= TheoryInc(∆2, L2).
In case L1 = L2(= L) we say that ∆1 has smaller than or equal inconsistency as
∆2 iff TheoryInc(∆1, L)  TheoryInc(∆2, L) and we write ∆1 ≤Linc ∆2.
Example 11. Let L = 〈{p}, {i}〉,∆1 = {@ip} and ∆2 = {@ip,@i¬p}.
TheoryInc(∆1, L) = 〈0, 0, 0, ...〉
TheoryInc(∆2, L) = 〈1
1
,
1
2
,
1
3
, ...〉
Then ∆1 ≤Linc ∆2.
Proposition 3.24. Let L be a hybrid similarity type, ∆1,∆2 ⊆ FormNNF(@)(L).
If ∆1 ⊆ ∆2, then TheoryInc(∆1, L)  TheoryInc(∆2, L).
Proof. Additional statements may add but cannot subtract contradictions. 
Proposition 3.25. Let L1 = 〈Prop1,Nom1〉, L2 = 〈Prop2,Nom2〉 and ∆ ⊆
FormNNF(@)(L1). If L1 ⊆ L2, i.e., Prop1 ⊆ Prop2 and Nom1 ⊆ Nom2, then
TheoryInc(∆, L1)  TheoryInc(∆, L2).
Proof. Let n be such that rn 6= ∗. For a domain Wn, such that |Wn| = n,
IL(L1(Wn)) ⊆ IL(L2(Wn)).
The fact that Prop1 ⊆ Prop2 does not interfere with the construction of preferred
QH models of ∆.
By Theorem 3.19, two preferred models for the same set of formulas ∆ and
domain Wn have the same size of Conflictbase.
Hence, for each Wn, for M1,n ∈ PQH(L1,∆,Wn),M2,n ∈ PQH(L2,∆,Wn),
|Conflictbase(M1,n)| = |Conflictbase(M2,n)|.
But the denominator of ModelInc(M1,n, L1,Wn), |IL(L1(Wn))|, is smaller than
the denominator of ModelInc(M2,n, L2,Wn), |IL(L2(Wn))|, for all Wn.
Which means that TheoryInc(∆, L1)  TheoryInc(∆, L2).

The next example shows that if ∆1 ⊆ ∆2 and L1 ⊆ L2 then it is not necessarily
the case that TheoryInc(∆1, L1)  TheoryInc(∆2, L2).
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Example 12. Let
L1 = 〈{p}, {i}〉 and ∆1 = {@ip}
L2 = 〈{p}, {i}〉 and ∆2 = {@ip,@i¬p}
L3 = 〈{p, q}, {i}〉 and ∆3 = {@ip,@i¬p,@iq}
In this case L1 ⊆ L2 ⊆ L3 and ∆1 ⊆ ∆2 ⊆ ∆3; however,
TheoryInc(∆1, L1) ≺ TheoryInc(∆2, L2)
TheoryInc(∆3, L3) ≺ TheoryInc(∆2, L2)
Definition 3.26. For ∆1,∆2 ⊆ FormNNF(@)(L),∆1 is QH-equivalent to ∆2 if, for
all M, M is a QH model of ∆1 iff M is a QH model of ∆2.
Proposition 3.27. Let L be a hybrid similarity type, ∆1,∆2 ⊆ FormNNF(@)(L).
If ∆1 is QH-equivalent to ∆2, then
TheoryInc(∆1, L) = TheoryInc(∆2, L).
Proof. Since ∆1 is QH-equivalent to ∆2, any preferred QH model M′ of ∆1 is a
preferred QH model of ∆2.
Therefore, for a fixed domain Wn we may consider the same preferred model and
consequently for all n, the nth element in the sequence TheoryInc(∆1, L) and the
nth element in the sequence TheoryInc(∆2, L) are equal. 
Resembling the definition of extrinsic inconsistency, we introduce the definition
of intrinsic inconsistency of a set of formulas ∆, for a specific similarity type L
defined with recourse to ∆, as follows:
Definition 3.28. For a given theory ∆, let L∆ be a hybrid similarity type that
contains exactly the propositional variables and nominals that occur in ∆. We
define the intrinsic inconsistency of ∆, TheoryInc(∆), as:
TheoryInc(∆) = TheoryInc(∆, L∆)
.
So the measure of intrinsic inconsistency of a theory TheoryInc(∆), delineates
the degree of the theory in its own terms, whereas the extrinsic inconsistency of
a theory TheoryInc(∆, L) delineates the degree of the theory with respect to the
hybrid similarity type L.
Example 13. Let L = 〈{p, q, r}, {i, j}〉,∆ = {@ip,@j¬p,@ir,@i¬r}.
TheoryInc(∆, L) = 〈∗, 1
6
,
1
9
,
1
12
, ...〉
TheoryInc(∆) = 〈∗, 1
4
,
1
6
,
1
8
, ...〉
When TheoryInc(∆1)  TheoryInc(∆2) we say that ∆1 has smaller than or
equal inconsistency as ∆2.
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4. Inconsistency and Bisimulation
We generalize the notion of bisimulation for a hybrid bistructure.
Definition 4.1. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type and E =
(W,R,N, V +, V −), E′ = (W ′, R′, N ′, V ′+, V ′−) be two hybrid bistructures. A re-
lation Z ⊂W ×W ′ is a paraconsistent bisimulation if Z is a bisimulation between
the hybrid structures F = (W,R,N, V +) and F ′ = (W ′, R′, N ′, V ′+) and also a
bisimulation between G = (W,R,N, V −) and G′ = (W ′, R′, N ′, V ′−).
The following proposition reformulates the notion of bisimulation in terms of the
representation of bistructures.
Proposition 4.2. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type, E, E′ be
two hybrid bistructures and M and M′ their syntactic representations. A relation
Z ⊆W ×W ′ is a paraconsistent bisimulation between E and E′ iff
• for each i ∈ Nom, N(i)ZN ′(i);
• for every pair (w,w′) ∈ Z we have:
– Atomic conditions:
∗ @wp ∈M iff @w′p ∈M′, for all p ∈ Prop.
∗ @w¬p ∈M iff @w′¬p ∈M′, for all p ∈ Prop.
∗ for all i ∈ Nom, N(i) = w iff N ′(i) = w′.
– if @w3u ∈ M for some u ∈ W , then there is some u′ ∈ W ′ such that
@w′3u
′ ∈M′ and uZu′ (Zig),
– if @w′3u
′ ∈ M′ for some u′ ∈ W ′, then there is some u ∈ W such
that @w3u and uZu
′ (Zag).
Two bisimilar bistructures may have different conflict bases. Clearly this is the
case when the witness bisimulation is not total or is not surjective. Moreover, these
two conditions, together, are not sufficient as it is shown in the following examples:
Example 14. The bisimulation represented in Figure 7, although being a total and
surjective relation, does not imply the same conflict base in both bistructures.
Figure 7. Bisimulation 1.
Example 15. The bisimulation represented in Figure 8, a surjective function, does
not guarantee that the bisimilar bistructures have the same conflict base.
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Figure 8. Bisimulation 2.
Example 16. A bisimulation which is a bijective function between bistructures al-
lows us to have always the same conflict base in the bisimilar bistructures. The
result is proved below, and an example is represented in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Bisimulation 3.
Next theorem states that two bisimilar bistructures such that the bisimulation
is a bijective bounded morphism have the same conflict base.
Theorem 4.3. Let L = 〈Prop,Nom〉 be a hybrid similarity type, and let E =
(W,R,N, V +, V −) and E′ = (W ′, R′, N ′, V ′+, V ′−) be two hybrid bistructures with
M and M′ their representations. If E and E′ are bisimilar via a bijective function
Z, then ModelInc(M, L,W ) = ModelInc(M′, L,W ′).
Proof. A bijective function between W and W ′ means that both have the same
cardinality. Moreover, from the atomic conditions in Proposition 4.2, the conflict
bases for each bistructure coincide. 
5. Conclusions and Further Work
Inconsistency is a pervasive, and unavoidable, topic in data and knowledge man-
agement. It manifests itself in several domains ranging from automated reasoning
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(for example in the context of the so-called question-answering systems) to replica-
tion of databases and redundancy enforcing of data distributed in the cloud. The
recent paradigm of service oriented computing may also become a typical source
of inconsistent, or partially consistent data. Main issues addressed in this area
concern information integration, data merging and querying mechanisms for incon-
sistent databases [16], among others.
Almost all previous research was mainly concerned with procedures to detect and
remove inconsistencies, rather than with reasoning in the presence of inconsistency.
The latter is the topic of this paper, as it is also that of [19]. More specifically,
we provide a measure of inconsistency for a knowledge base represented by a set
of hybrid literals. This allows us to compare between different knowledge bases
and evaluate their quality of information thus serving as a guide for an informed
choice. This is achieved through the introduction of a quasi-hybrid logic along
with the concept of a bistructure. In order to accommodate contradictions, the
satisfaction relation is decoupled. Similar to the method of diagrams in hybrid
logic, we consider minimal models, w.r.t. contradictions, of a certain set of formulas
as sets of quasi-hybrid literals. To compare implementations we define the ratio of
inconsistency which may differentiate between minimal models for the same set of
formulas. Recently we have used this logic to reason in the healthcare delivery
process [13]. Although in such paper there are just discussed small examples, it
paves the way for interesting applications of quasi-hybrid logic.
Studying paraconsistency in the context of quantified hybrid logic is a main topic
for future research. We are confident that this can be done along the guidelines that
drove this work. The representation of a model by literals can also be computed, and
the discussion about contradictions in minimal models, although more technical,
can be done. Another issue that we would like to address is paraconsistency on
modalities, by avoiding the standard duality between 2 and 3. This study was
initiated by J. Marcos in [23]. A final topic for further research in the context
of quantified hybrid logic, is the formulation of an analogue to the Herbrand’s
Theorem based on the diagram representation discussed here.
In this work there is no discussion concerning proof-theoretical aspects of quasi-
classical logic. However, it is well-known that one important motivation for quasi-
classical logic is the separation of analytic and synthetic stages of proof. First we
analyse premises, and then infer new conclusions. The study of this issue in quasi-
hybrid logic should be done. The challenge is how to combine the proof-theoretical
features of quasi-classical logic with the hybrid ones.
Acknowledgements. This work was funded by ERDF - European Regional De-
velopment Fund through the COMPETE Programme (operational programme for
competitiveness) and by National Funds through the FCT (Portuguese Founda-
tion for Science and Technology) within project FCOMP-01-0124-FEDER-028923
(Nasoni) and the project PEst-OE/MAT/UI4106/2013. The second author also
acknowledges the financial assistance given by the project GetFun, reference FP7-
PEOPLE-2012-IRSES.
References
[1] O. Arieli and A. Avron. The value of the four values. Artif. Intell., 102(1):97–141, 1998.
[2] O. Arieli and A. Zamansky. Distance-based non-deterministic semantics for reasoning with
uncertainty. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 17(4):325–350, 2009.
27
[3] O. Arieli and A. Zamansky. A framework for reasoning under uncertainty based on non-
deterministic distance semantics. Int. J. Approx. Reasoning, 52(2):184–211, 2011.
[4] D. Batens. Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic. Studies in logic and computation. Research
Studies Press Limited, 2000.
[5] P. Besnard and A. Hunter. Quasi-classical logic: Non-trivializable classical reasoning from
inconsistent information. In C. Froidevaux and J. Kohlas, editors, Symbolic and Quantitative
Approaches to Reasoning and Uncertainty, volume 946 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 44–51. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1995.
[6] J.-Y. Be´ziau, W. Carnielli, and D. Gabbay, editors. Handbook of paraconsistency. London:
College Publications, 2007.
[7] P. Blackburn. Internalizing labelled deduction. J. Log. Comput., 10(1):137–168, 2000.
[8] P. Blackburn. Representation, reasoning, and relational structures: A hybrid logic manifesto.
Log. J. IGPL, 8(3):339–365, 2000.
[9] P. Blackburn, M. de Rijke, and Y. Venema. Modal logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
[10] G. S. Boolos, J. P. Burgess, and R. C. Jeffrey. Computability and logic. 5th ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 5th ed. edition, 2007.
[11] T. Brau¨ner. Axioms for classical, intuitionistic, and paraconsistent hybrid logic. J. Logic
Lang. Inf., 15(3):179–194, 2006.
[12] W. Carnielli, M. Coniglio, and I. D’ottaviano. Paraconsistency: The Logical Way to the
Inconsistent. Lecture Notes in Pure and Applied Mathematics. Taylor & Francis, 2010.
[13] D. Costa and M. A. Martins. Inconsistencies in health care knowledge. In The 1st Interna-
tional Workshop on Reliability of eHealth Information Systems - IEEE HEALTHCOM 2014,
pages 37–42. IEEE 16th International Conference on e-Health Networking, Applications and
Services (Healthcom), 2014.
[14] N. C. A. da Costa and D. Krause. Remarks on the applications of paraconsistent logic to
physics. Discurso Editorial, December 2006.
[15] J. I. da Silva Filho, G. Lambert-Torres, and J. M. Abe. Uncertainty treatment using paracon-
sistent logic. Introducing paraconsistent artificial neural networks. In Frontiers in Artificial
Intelligence and Applications, volume 211, pages 1–311. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2010.
[16] S. de Amo and M. S. Pais. A paraconsistent logic programming approach for querying incon-
sistent databases. Int. J. Approx. Reasoning, 46(2):366–386, Oct. 2007.
[17] H. de Nivelle, R. A. Schmidt, and U. Hustadt. Resolution-based methods for modal logics.
Log. J. IGPL, 8(3):265–292, 2000.
[18] N. A. Ernst, A. Borgida, I. J. Jureta, and J. Mylopoulos. Agile requirements engineering via
paraconsistent reasoning. Information Systems, (0):–, 2013.
[19] J. Grant and A. Hunter. Measuring inconsistency in knowledgebases. Journal of Intelligent
Information Systems, 27(2):159–184, 2006.
[20] J. Grant and A. Hunter. Analysing inconsistent first-order knowledgebases. Artif. Intell.,
172(8-9):1064–1093, 2008.
[21] A. Hunter and S. Konieczny. On the measure of conflicts: Shapley inconsistency values. Artif.
Intell., 174(14):1007–1026, 2010.
[22] S. Jas´kowski. A propositional calculus for inconsistent deductive systems. Log. Log. Philos.,
7:35–56, 1999.
[23] J. Marcos. Modality and paraconsistency. In L. Beˇhounek and M. B´ılkova´, editors, Logica
Yearbook 2004, pages 213–222. Filosofia, Prague, 2005.
[24] C. A. Middelburg. A survey of paraconsistent logics. CoRR, abs/1103.4324, 2011.
[25] A. Prior. Past, present and future. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press 1967. X, 217 p. 38 s.
(1967)., 1967.
[26] K. Tanaka, F. Berto, and E. Mares. Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications: Logic and
Applications. Logic, epistemology and the unity of science. Springer, 2012.
[27] B. ten Cate. Model theory for extended modal languages. PhD thesis, University of Amster-
dam, 2005. ILLC Dissertation Series DS-2005-01.
[28] J. Villadsen. Paraconsistent query answering systems. Logical Studies Online Journal, 1999.
[29] M. K. Yusof and A. Azlan. Comparative Study of Techniques in Reducing Inconsistent Data.
International Journal of Database Theory and Application, 5(1):37–46, 2012.
